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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Philip Edwards appeals the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment
to the Geisinger Clinic (“Geisinger”) on his breach of employment contract claim.
Edwards contends that the District Court erred in finding that there was no genuine
dispute of material fact concerning whether he had an express employment contract for a
definite term with Geisinger. We reject Edwards’s argument and will affirm.
I.
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case, so we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. Edwards is
a licensed physician from the United Kingdom who specializes in interventional
radiology. Before 2006, Edwards had a temporary visa to work in Kentucky. In early
2006, while Edwards was working in Kentucky, the chair of Geisinger’s interventional
radiology department, Dr. Dominick Conca, began recruiting Edwards to work at
Geisinger’s clinic in Danville, Pennsylvania. During Edwards’s interviews with
Geisinger, Edwards and Conca discussed that Edwards wanted to obtain board
certification from the American Board of Radiology (the “ABR”), which Geisinger
requires new physicians to receive. To obtain board certification from the ABR, a
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physician must complete four years of uninterrupted employment at an approved
residency program.
During Edwards’s interviews, Conca asked Edwards if he understood that he
“need[ed] to be here [at Geisinger] for at least four years and [that he] ha[d] to get [his]
boards” within six years, or else “Geisinger would have to review [his] situation.” (A.
227.) Edwards stated that he understood and indicated that he was seeking a position at
Geisinger in part to obtain board certification. Subsequently, Edwards and Conca had
several conversations both before and after Edwards accepted employment at Geisinger
to develop a program that would enable Edwards to obtain board certification within four
to six years.
On July 5, 2006, Conca delivered to Edwards a formal offer letter. The offer letter
reiterates that “[b]oard certification . . . is a requirement for physicians in the Geisinger
Clinic.” (A. 260.) It further provides that Edwards “will be granted 4-6 years from the
date of employment to become board certified,” and that if he fails to obtain board
certification within six years, “continued employment . . . will need to be reevaluated.”
(A. 260.) The offer letter notes that Edwards’s offer is subject to executing a “Practice
Agreement,” but Edwards claims that Geisinger failed to enclose the Practice Agreement
with the offer letter. (A. 259.) Edwards contends that he reviewed the offer letter and
signed it on July 11, 2006 without receiving the Practice Agreement.
Nine days later, Edwards signed Geisinger’s formal employment application. The
application states:
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I . . . [u]nderstand that my employment and/or contract cannot
be terminated for[] [a]dvocating for medically necessary and
appropriate health care[;] . . . [f]iling a grievance on behalf of
an enrollee of a managed care plan; . . . [p]rotesting a
decision, policy or practice that I believe interferes with my
ability to provide medically necessary and appropriate health
care[;] . . . [h]aving a practice which includes a substantial
number of patients with expensive medical conditions; or
[o]bjecting to the provision of or refusing to provide health
care services on moral or religious grounds.
(A. 264.)
After Edwards signed his offer letter, Geisinger communicated with the ABR to
ensure that Edwards would be able to sit for the boards after four to six years. In this
regard, Geisinger sent Edwards’s offer letter to the ABR.
Edwards’s temporary visa expired, requiring that he return to the United
Kingdom. Edwards and Geisinger communicated with United States immigration
authorities to obtain an H-1B visa to allow Edwards to return to the United States and to
work for Geisinger. Edwards alleges that both he and Geisinger needed to represent to
United States immigration authorities that he “had at least a three year employment
commitment” with Geisinger to obtain the visa. (A. 274.)
In 2007, Edwards received his visa and moved from the United Kingdom to
Danville, Pennsylvania to begin working for Geisinger. One to two months after he
began working for Geisinger, he signed the Practice Agreement referenced in his original
offer letter. 1 The Practice Agreement provides that Edwards “acknowledge[s] that [his]
1

Edwards stated in his deposition that he is uncertain whether he signed the
Practice Agreement on July 11, 2006 or shortly after beginning to work for Geisinger, but
he believes that he most likely signed it after beginning to work for Geisinger. On
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employment with Geisinger is ‘at will’ and may be terminated at any time by either party
for any or no reason.” (A. 136.)
Edwards contends that he did not see the “at will” language in the Practice
Agreement because Conca called him into his office and told him that a document needed
to be signed. He further asserts that Conca stated that it was “nothing important, but it
would help if we could just get it signed.” (A. 232.) Edwards notes that he “was given a
very short period of time” and “had a patient on the table,” so he flipped through the
Practice Agreement without reading it carefully, asked Conca which date he should write,
and dated it as July 11, 2006 according to Conca’s instructions. (A. 232-33.) He states
that he “would have been circumspect about accepting the position” if he had seen the atwill provision before deciding whether to accept Geisinger’s offer. (A. 234.)
In May 2008, Geisinger terminated Edwards’s employment. Edwards sued
Geisinger on September 4, 2008 for breach of contract, seeking declaratory relief,
specific performance, and a preliminary injunction. Edwards withdrew his request for a
preliminary injunction, and the District Court dismissed Edwards’s request for specific
performance. On September 13, 2010, Geisinger moved for summary judgment, arguing
that Edwards’s employment contract was at-will. The District Court agreed that

appeal, he contends that he signed the Practice Agreement shortly after beginning to work
for Geisinger. Because the District Court disposed of Edwards’s case on summary
judgment, we resolve this possible factual issue in favor of Edwards and accept for
purposes of this appeal that he signed the Practice Agreement after beginning to work for
Geisinger. See Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992) (we
view the facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” on a motion for
summary judgment).
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Edwards’s employment was at-will and granted summary judgment to Geisinger.
Edwards then filed this appeal.
II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over district
court decisions granting summary judgment. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206
F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant
demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). As the parties agree, we apply Pennsylvania law because the parties’ dispute
concerns an employment contract in Pennsylvania.
Edwards contends that the District Court erred in holding that his employment was
at-will because he contends that he and Geisinger entered into an express employment
contract for a definite term. He argues that he raised a genuine dispute of material fact of
whether he had an express contract for a definite term because (a) Geisinger emphasized
the ABR’s four-year residency requirement for board certification during recruitment
discussions and in its offer letter, (b) Geisinger did not include an at-will disclaimer in its
offer letter or in its employment application, (c) Geisinger’s employment application lists
restrictions to its right to terminate its employees, and (d) Geisinger represented to the
ABR and to United States immigration authorities that it committed to hire Edwards for a
definite term. We reject each of Edwards’s arguments, holding that Edwards has failed to
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raise a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether he had an express
employment contract for a definite term. 2
A.
Pennsylvania law presumes that employment is at-will. See Scully v. US WATS,
Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2001). To overcome the presumption of employment atwill, an employee “must show clear and precise evidence” that the parties intended to
enter an employment contract for a definite term. Id. In analyzing the parties’ intent, we
consider “the surrounding circumstances.” Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491, 493 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987). An employee’s “subjective expectation of . . . guaranteed employment
. . . based on employer practices or vague employer superlatives” does not demonstrate
an employment contract for a definite term. Scully, 238 F.3d at 505. Likewise,
“comments which merely evince an employer’s hope that the employee will remain” are

2

In Edwards’s opening brief, he also contends that he provided additional
consideration to Geisinger, primarily by moving from the United Kingdom to
Pennsylvania to accept Geisinger’s offer. However, Edwards claims elsewhere in his
brief that he relies only on an express contract theory and not on an implied contract
theory, even though additional consideration may support a finding of an implied contract
to retain the employee for a reasonable period of time. See, e.g., Cashdollar v. Mercy
Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 595 A.2d 70, 74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that additional
consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of
employment); Scullion v. EMECO Indus., Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (including additional consideration as a factor in determining whether an employee
had an implied contract to be employed for a reasonable time period). At oral argument,
Edwards again stated that he was relying only on an express contract theory, and clarified
that he raised an additional consideration argument only to illustrate the circumstances
surrounding his employment contract with Geisinger. Because Edwards argues only that
he had an express contract, we do not address whether he may have provided sufficient
additional consideration to Geisinger to create an implied contract for a reasonable period
of time.
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inadequate to prove a contract for a definite term. Marsh, 530 A.2d at 493 (quoting Veno
v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
As an initial matter, we believe that Geisinger and Edwards demonstrated their
mutual intent for Edwards to be an employee at-will when they both willingly signed the
Practice Agreement. See, e.g., Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 661
(3d Cir. 1990) (an agreement stating that an employee is at-will “is difficult to reconcile”
with the employee’s later attempt to characterize his or her employment as terminable for
cause only). Edwards counters that he did not notice the Practice Agreement’s at-will
term because he reviewed the Practice Agreement quickly. However, “[i]gnorance of the
contents of a document or failure to read before signing is no defense to a contractual
obligation under Pennsylvania law.” Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 900 (3d
Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459
U.S. 56 (1982). Although we decline to decide whether the at-will term in the Practice
Agreement is enforceable as a contractual obligation, we believe that Schoch v. First
Fidelity Bancorporation and Tose v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. nonetheless support
recognizing the Practice Agreement’s at-will language as evidence of the parties’ mutual
intent and understanding.
B.
Turning to Edwards’s arguments, we agree with the District Court that Geisinger’s
statements concerning employment for four to six years during recruitment discussions
and in Edwards’s offer letter were too vague to establish an express contract for a definite
term. See Scully, 238 F.3d at 505 (“vague” employer statements do not establish a
8

contract of employment for a definite term). We believe that Conca’s statements during
recruitment, such as Conca’s question of whether Edwards understood that he “need[ed] .
. . to be here [at Geisinger] for at least four years and . . . to get [his] boards,” explained
Geisinger’s board certification requirement and expressed Geisinger’s hope that Edwards
would work for four to six years to obtain board certification. (A. 227.) We do not
believe that Geisinger’s statements demonstrated that it intended to guarantee at least four
years of employment.
Likewise, although the offer letter includes a paragraph stating that Edwards “will
be granted 4-6 years from the date of employment” to receive board certification, the
same paragraph begins with a disclaimer that board certification is a requirement for
working for Geisinger. (A. 260.) The offer letter then concludes by implying that
Edwards will risk losing his employment if he fails to receive board certification within
four to six years. Accordingly, the “will be granted” language in the offer letter appears
to clarify Geisinger’s board certification requirement rather than to promise employment
for a definite term.
Further, we reject Edwards’s argument that Geisinger implied that it was
guaranteeing employment for a definite term by failing to include an at-will disclaimer in
its offer letter or in its employment application. As explained in Section II(A) supra,
Pennsylvania law presumes that employment is at-will. See Scully, 238 F.3d at 505.
Accordingly, the absence of an at-will disclaimer does not indicate that the parties
contracted for employment for a definite term.
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Next, we reject Edwards’s argument that Geisinger’s employment application
suggests employment for a definite term. Although the employment application provides
a list of certain circumstances under which Geisinger may not terminate Edwards’s
employment, the application does not state that it alters the employment relationship for
any other circumstances. Indeed, the application’s list of enumerated circumstances
suggests that Geisinger reserved the right to terminate Edwards for all other reasons.
We believe that the declarations in the job application are most like policy
statements in employee handbooks, which form a contract under Pennsylvania law only
when the parties’ intent is clear and an employee reading the handbook “could reasonably
believe that a contract [for a definite term] did exist.” DiBonaventura v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 539 A.2d 865, 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). Pennsylvania courts typically find that
an employee handbook rebuts the presumption of employment at-will only when the
employer has included unambiguous language indicating its intent to create a relationship
terminable only for just cause. See Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp., 688 A.2d 211, 214
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“The handbook must contain a clear indication that the employer
intended to overcome the at-will presumption.”). Indeed, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held in Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp. that even language stating that the
employer would “discharge for just cause” did not establish an express or implied
contract that could be terminated only for just cause. Id. at 215. Much as in Luteran,
Geisinger’s employment application includes no language stating that it creates more
than an at-will relationship. Instead, the employment application appears more like an
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aspirational statement of employer and employee expectations, which does not establish
an express contract under Pennsylvania law.
Finally, Edwards contends that Geisinger expressed its intent to enter into a
contract for a definite term by communicating to the ABR that Edwards was participating
in its four-year board certification program and by sponsoring Edwards for a three-year
H-1B visa. Edwards’s argument concerning the ABR fails because he does not
demonstrate that Geisinger ever represented to the ABR that it was guaranteeing four
years of employment. Edwards relies primarily on just one facsimile by Geisinger’s
recruiter forwarding Edwards’s offer letter to the ABR. Edwards contends that the ABR
interpreted the offer letter “as a representation that both Edwards and Geisinger
committed to the ABR four year program requirement,” presumably because the ABR
noted that Edwards would work for Geisinger from October 1, 2006 to September 30,
2010. (Appellant’s Br. 10.) The ABR’s interpretation of Geisinger’s offer letter
facsimile is not relevant to proving that Geisinger intended to guarantee four years of
employment. Further, even if the ABR’s interpretation was relevant, the ABR’s notation
stating that Edwards would work at Geisinger from October 1, 2006 to September 30,
2010 does not demonstrate that it understood Geisinger as guaranteeing four years of
employment. At most, it demonstrates that the ABR anticipated that Edwards would
work for Geisinger for four years.
Likewise, we reject Edwards’s argument that he and Geisinger entered into an
express employment contract for a definite term when Geisinger agreed to sponsor
Edwards’s H-1B visa. An H-1B visa is a temporary work visa that lasts up to three years
11

with the possibility of renewal. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.750(a)(1) (2008). As Edwards
appears to acknowledge, an H-1B visa does not guarantee employment for the visa’s
maximum duration. Indeed, the Immigration and Nationality Act expressly contemplates
that an employer may dismiss a worker with an H-1B visa before the end of the visa’s
maximum duration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(5)(A) (stating that an employer must pay
return expenses if it dismisses an employee “before the end of the period of authorized
admission”). Accordingly, sponsorship of an H-1B visa alone does not imply that the
employer-sponsor has guaranteed employment for the visa’s duration. See, e.g., Woods v.
Era Med LLC, 677 F. Supp. 2d 806, 818 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that an employer’s
sponsorship of an employee’s O-1 visa does not establish an employment contract for a
definite term).
Although Edwards argues that Geisinger and Edwards “represent[ed] to the
immigration authorities in the United States that Edwards had at least a three year
employment commitment,” he fails to provide evidence of any actual communications.
(Appellant’s Br. 10.) Instead, he asserts that he believes that Geisinger “had to represent
to the immigration authorities in the United States that Dr. Edwards had at least a three
year employment commitment, as the visa is for a minimum three year period.” (A. 274.)
We do not believe that Edwards’s conclusory allegation that Geisinger must have
represented to United States immigration authorities that it would employ Edwards for
three years raises a genuine dispute of material fact. Accordingly, because Edwards has
failed to raise any genuine dispute of material fact supporting his claim that he had an
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express employment contract for a definite term, we agree with the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment to Geisinger.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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